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Saint Petersburg has a special mis-
sion in delivering national development 
priorities, ensuring sustainable eco-
nomic growth, and commercializing 
R&D. This necessitates research on the 
situation in the corporate sector, in-
cluding investment potential and pro-
pensity to invest. The authors estimate 
the readiness of Saint Petersburg pub-
lic companies to employ investment tools 
in delivering development strategies, 
which determine to a large extent the 
competitiveness of the city’s economy. 
This article presents a study into the 
response of twenty local public compa-
nies to changes in the economy and 
their ability to stay efficient and pre-
serve investment potential in volatile 
economic conditions. The measures ta-
ken by the companies are considered 
as inert and inefficient. The authors 
surveyed managers from 70 Russian 
non-public companies, who confirmed 
the hypothesis that businesses are in-
terested in investing in the earning as-
sets (securities) of other companies to 
receive interest (dividends). The res-
pondents tend to associate the risk of 
such investments with the issuer’s cor-
porate control and corporate govern-
ance, which often fall short of best pra-
ctices. The authors conclude that there 
is a need to improve knowledge of cor-
porate relations, which affect competi-
tiveness and the raising of funds neces-
sary for sustainable economic growth 
in Saint Petersburg. 
 
Keywords: economic growth, stra-
tegy for regional socioeconomic devel-
opment, investment resources, public 
joint-stock companies, corporate go-
vernance 
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Introduction 
 
With a population of one million people, Saint Petersburg is the eco-
nomic centre and the only agglomeration in Russia’s North-West. The 
city experiences scattered industrialisation and economic space polarisa-
tion. Saint Petersburg’s influence on the national economic space is con-
stantly increasing [1, p. 111; 116]. 
Buoyed by investment, Saint Petersburg is the fourth strongest re-
gional economy in Russia [2]. 
The city’s coastal location, large sales market, and a number of other 
factors have translated into investment attractiveness and investment 
flows from developed economies [3, p. 128] 
However, specialists from the Expert RA rating agency report as fol-
lows. The current period of growing investment risks has been the long-
est since observations began in 1996. As a result, the localisation of in-
ternational consumer goods — primarily automobile — production has 
turned into a threat rather than a benefit for the city’s development. In-
vestment in defence is also past its peak [4]. 
There is an urgent need to solve the city’s economic problems listed 
in the ‘Economic development and knowledge economy in Saint Peters-
burg’ state programme for 2015—2020. These are as follows: 
 international rating agencies downgraded the city’s credit outlook 
from stable to negative at the beginning of 2014; 
 investment has reduced and investment attraction rates have been 
unstable. 
In Saint Petersburg, the dynamics of fixed investment has always dif-
fered from the national average (fig. 1). 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Fixed investment,% of the previous year’s level 
 
Based on: Rosstat. URL: www.gks.ru 
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In 2016, the proportion of public fixed investment dwindled to 16 %, 
as compared to 18—19.5 % in the previous years. Whereas, at the nation-
al level, the proportion of federal fixed investment fell from 10 % to 9 %, 
Saint Petersburg witnessed a dramatic reduction to 5.8 %. 
To secure leadership in Russia and the Baltic region and to ensure in-
novative social and economic development until 2030, Saint Petersburg 
needs substantial investment resources. Only fixed investment should in-
crease from 351.9 bn rouble in 2012 to 3000 bn rouble in 2030. A sine 
qua non is a more efficient use of investment resources [2]. 
An important source of finance and investment in the city’s strategic 
development is highly liquid assets — securities and other financial in-
struments. This warrants an assessment of the investment characteristics 
of Saint Petersburg corporate sector and companies’ ability to attract 
funds in order to implement their strategies in the corporate capital mar-
ket and to create conditions for the successful development of promising 
industries. 
The competitiveness, efficiency, and investment attractiveness of the 
corporate sector — chiefly, public companies — is impossible without a 
flexible reaction to changes in the economy. Such a reaction consists in 
asset and business area optimisation, management and control improve-
ment, and information disclosure for shareholders and investors to make 
informed decisions. 
Key to the mobilisation of investment leverages for development is 
the quality of corporate governance, which defines the system of relations 
between the executive bodies of the public company and its board of di-
rectors, shareholders, and other stakeholders. Within corporate govern-
ance, the theoretical structures of management theories localise in organi-
sations through the activities and interactions of individuals. This creates 
microfoundations for dynamic capabilities [5, p. 4; 6, p. 42]. 
Constant efforts to enhance corporate governance are required not on-
ly to cater for the interests of shareholders and corporations. The World 
Economic Forum’s annual Global Competitiveness Report considers the 
efficacy of corporate boards in calculating the overall competitiveness 
index [7, p. 46—48]. The recent Ease of Doing Business ranking places 
Russia 66th of 189. This year, the country has improved its position by 44 
places. The regulation of the Government of the Russian Federation of 
June 25, 2016 No. 1315—3 approved of a ‘Corporate governance En-
hancement’ roadmap. The protecting minority investors index of the Do-
ing Business ranking was chosen as control indicator. Its value should 
increase from 5.67 in 2017 to 6.67—6.83 in 2018 [8]. 
Business community contributes to the development of corporate 
governance and relations. Supporters of the cause are the Centre for Cor-
porate Relations Development and Economic Dispute Resolution non-
profit partnership, the Joint Committee on Corporate Ethics of the Rus-
sian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, the National Corporate 
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Governance Council (NCGC), and other organisations established to de-
velop, introduce, and monitor advanced professional standards in Russian 
companies. Since 2008, the NCGC has published National Corporate 
Governance report [9]. 
However, corporate governance suffers from one of the unsolved 
problems of Russia’s economic policy. This is the persistent lack of co-
ordination between the policy’s tools and priorities at national, regional, 
industry, and corporate levels [10]. Authoritative methods for evaluating 
regional development — even those that estimate the capability to fore-
cast, and react to socioeconomic crises [11; 12] — do not consider the 
corporate governance of local companies. 
This study aims to evaluate the efficiency of Saint Petersburg public 
companies, in particular, the contribution of corporate governance to in-
vestment attractiveness, economic growth, and the implementation of the 
city’s Strategy for Economic and Social Development until 2030 [2]. 
Another objective is to identify motives behind the decisions made by 
shareholders and potential investors and acceptable conditions of share-
holding and debt security purchase. 
 
 
Methods 
 
When discussing conditions for economic growth, it is important to 
understand what behaviour of economic agents is indicative of their ca-
pability to attain long-term goals in a complex, challenging, and changing 
environment, to stay competitive in national and international markets, 
and to contribute to the development of regional economies. 
The contribution of public companies to ensuring multi-channel fi-
nancing and attracting private resources to strategic projects and activities 
is enormous. On the one hand, the shares of public companies are availa-
ble to any investor in the stock market. On the other hand, companies 
must be flexible in their reactions to the requests of stock market regula-
tors and both national and international investors to increase the transpar-
ency and quality of corporate governance. 
In corporate governance, any ineffective or unconscientious action 
leads to reputational damages in the capital market and limits the oppor-
tunities of external investors. Better corporate governance has become 
key to the investment attractiveness of public companies and, thus, to in-
vestment climate and investment activities in a region. 
An evaluation of corporate governance can use a different number of 
components, have a varying level of detail, and employ one or several 
methods. Below we will consider current practices. 
At first glance, when evaluating investment attractiveness, a compa-
ny’s market value and dividends paid seem to be principal criteria for as-
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sessing the management efficiency. However, the ‘imperfections’ of the 
market and the situation in it affect these parameters. In some cases, 
guided by a flawed financial model, a company’s management makes 
mistakes when identifying key competences necessary for implementing 
its strategy [13, p. 26—27]. 
The ЕcoDa (European Confederation of Directors’ Associations) and 
IFC (International Finance Corporation) link an increase in governance 
efficiency to the ‘comply or explain’ principle [14, p. 6]. In Russia, the 
document regulating corporate governance enhancement is the Corporate 
Governance Code of 2014 (referred to as the Code below) [15]. Today, 
all public companies have to incorporate information on compliance with 
the Code’s principles and recommendations into their annual reports 
(§ 70.3—70.4 of the bank of Russia Regulation of December 30, 2014, 
N 454-P On Information Disclosure by Issuers of Mass-Issued Securities. 
When analysing non-public companies, researchers usually estimate the 
quality of corporate governance based on the KPI system [16, p. 70]. 
We believe that corporate governance ratings are largely overlooked 
as an evaluation tool by shareholders, investors, companies, and regulat-
ing authorities. Internationally, many ratings — Governance, Manage-
ment, Accountability Metrics and Analysis (GAMMA), Transparency 
and disclosure (T&D) Rating, The Audit Integrity Accounting and Gov-
ernance Risk rating (AGR®), Board Effectiveness Rating, Institutional 
Shareholder Services Corporate Governance Quotien (ISS CGQ), and 
Overall GMI rating — monitor the compliance of public companies gov-
ernance with requirements for protecting shareholder’s rights. Until 2011, 
the Standard&Poor’s credit-rating agencies evaluated corporate govern-
ance in Russian companies. The Russian Institute of Directors has calcu-
lated the National Corporate Governance Rating (NCGR®) since 2004 
[17, p. 80—88]. Experts emphasise that ratings are effective evaluation 
tools. They are targeted, comprehensive, easily adjusted, representative, 
easy-to-interpret, independent, frequently updated, and relatively cheap 
to calculate [18, pp. 19, 89]. Business communities’ lack of interest in 
corporate governance as an evaluation tool deserves a close study. 
This article evaluates corporate governance in 20 out of 85 Saint Pe-
tersburg public companies from a perspective of an investor. The study 
uses information from the companies’ official websites, the National Set-
tlement Depository, the Moscow Exchange, Finam Holdings, and the 
SPARK system by Interfax. 
We surveyed 70 managers from Russian non-public companies. The 
questions concerned experience in attracting investment, future plans, 
and investment requirements. The goal was to understand to what degree 
business is interested in investing in the assets (securities) of other organ-
isations in order to receive income (dividends) from investment projects. 
Another objective was to assess the prospects of public companies at-
tracting investment through issuing corporate obligations and shares. 
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Findings 
 
The turnover of seventeen of the surveyed companies (with the ex-
ception of Bank Saint Petersburg, Vitabank, and Gazpromneft) accounts 
for 40.9 % of Saint Petersburg’s gross regional product. 
The surveyed companies operate in the following industries: 
 production of turbines (Power Machines); 
 production of gas turbines (except turbojets and turboprops) (Pro-
letarsky zavod); 
 production of spacecraft and aircraft parts and equipment (Tech-
pribor); 
 production of engines (excluding aircraft, automobile, and motor-
cycle engines); 
 production of communications equipment (Zvezda); 
 production of communications (Zavod Volna); 
 power generation (TGK-1); 
 power transmission and connection to distribution lines (Le-
nenergo); 
 fixed telephony (Rostelecom); 
 wholesaling of solid, liquid fuel, and related goods (Gazprom 
Neft); 
 wholesaling of automobile parts and equipment (excluding repre-
sentatives) (Rollman Group); 
 securities management (Arsagera management company); 
 monetary intermediation (Bank Saint Petersburg, Vitabank); 
 residential and mixed use development (Metrostroy); 
 testing and analysis of integrated mechanical and electric sys-
tems, energy inspection (Federal Testing Centre); 
 production of cereal flour (Leningrad Kirov Baking Factory, Pe-
tersburg Flour Mill). 
Svetlana, Inteltech, and Radiosvyaz public companies focus on R&D in 
natural sciences and technology. Techpribor, Zvezda, Power Machines, 
Proletarsky zavod, and Volna consider R&D as an auxiliary function. 
Most of the companies studied are leaders in innovation in such fields as: 
 civil and military aircraft (Tekhpribor); 
 high-speed diesel engines within the power range of 400—1,700 kW 
(Zvezda); 
 NPP turbines, including low-speed powered turbine units of a 
power of up to 1.5 GW, supercritical and ultra-supercritical steam tur-
bines of a power of above 660 MW, sustainable and efficient water turbi-
nes, and related equipment (Power Machines); 
 pumps for nuclear power plants (Proletarsky zavod). 
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The Techpribor public company and Zavod Volna R&D company are 
ready to expand the national import substitution programme through 
manufacturing electronic component that were earlier imported from 
NATO states (fuel measurement and alignment units, on-board engine 
control systems, fuel management systems, and data collecting and pro-
cessing units). 
Tables 1—4 show selected institutional characteristics of the public 
companies surveyed. 
 
Table 1 
 
The companies surveyd in registers 
 
Register Number  of companies
%  
of the total* 
Monopoly Register of the Federal antimonopoly 
Service 4 20.0 
List of Strategic Enterprises 1 5.0 
OAO list according to the Regulation of the Go-
vernment of the Russian federation N 91-R (‘golden 
share’) 1 5.0 
List of essential companies 2 10.0 
Defence industry registry 5 25.0 
Registry of accredited testing laboratories (centres) 2 10.0 
Registry of certificates issued by the Assay Cham-
ber of the Russian Federation 4 20.0 
Authorities issuing testing laboratory certificates 4 20.0 
Registry of personal data processors 4 20.0 
Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs 1 5.0 
Registry of trustees 1 5.0 
List of accountable companies (IFRS) 11 55.0 
Banks meeting requirements for bank guarantees 
issue for taxation purposes  1 5.0 
Registry of brokers 2 10.0 
Registry of dealers 2 10.0 
Registry of depositaries 2 10.0 
 
* Proportion in the total number of companies surveyed. 
Source: SPARK system. URL: http://www.spark-interfax.ru/ (accessed Ap-
ril 5, 2017). 
 
Many of the companies surveyed belong to the defence industry 
(25 %) and every fifth is a market leader (table 1). As a manufacturer of 
diesel engines, Zvezda is included in the registry of exclusive suppliers of 
Russian arms and military machinery. 
Most Saint Petersburg public companies are large manufacturers 
(61.1 %) (table 2). 
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Table 2 
 
Companies surveyed, by size 
 
Category Number  of companies % of the total* 
Large enterprises 11 61.1 
Medium enterprises 3 16.7 
Small enterprises 3 16.7 
Microeneterprises 1 5.5 
 
* excluding Bank Saint Petersburg, Vitabank. 
Source: SPARK information system. URL: http://www.spark-interfax.ru/ 
(accessed April 5, 2017). 
 
A microenterprise, Arsagera was the first Russian management com-
pany to go public on the Moscow Exchange. 
Small and microenterprises among public companies prompt a dis-
cussion about the superfluity of introduction of corporate governance 
best practices in certain cases [17, p. 44; 19, p. 64]. We believe that the 
‘comply or explain’ principle is obligatory for everyone. The problem 
can be solved through outsourcing certain corporate procedures — inter-
nal auditing and the functions of a company secretary, non-executive di-
rector, and shareholder representatives working under a contract. 
Most Saint-Petersburg public companies are privately owned (table 3). 
 
Table 3 
 
Companies surveyed, by ownership 
 
Ownership Number  of companies % of the total* 
Privately owned  11 57.9 
Joint private and foreign ownership 3 15.8 
Mixed Russian ownership (federal) 3 15.8 
Mixed Russian ownership (regional) 1 5.25 
Other mixed Russian ownership 1 5.25 
 
* excluding Gazprom Neft. 
Source: SPARK system. URL: http://www.spark-interfax.ru/ (accessed Ap-
ril 5, 2017). 
 
Foreign legal entities are among the owners of TGK-1, Bank Saint 
Petersburg, and the Rollman Group. 
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In companies owned in part by the government, the Russian Federa-
tion — represented by the Rosimushchestvo — encourages the introduc-
tion and development of corporate government tools. However, the other 
companies often lack both competencies and incentives to work in that 
direction. 
Saint Petersburg public companies are complex integrated structures. 
Most of the companies surveyed have considerable experience in mana-
ging groups of companies, subsidiaries, and affiliates (table 4). 
 
Table 4 
 
Number of co-owners, subsidiaries and affiliates  
of the companies surveyed 
 
Company name Number  of co-owners
Co-owners 
holding more 
than a 25 % 
stake 
Number  
of affiliates 
(company’s 
data) 
Number  
of branches 
(Rosstat) 
Gazprom Neft … … 57 1 
Rostelecom 17 1 47 70 
TGK-1 4 2 4 27 
Lenenergo 4 2 7 26 
Power Machines 1 1 8 9 
Metrostroy 8 1 15 4 
Leningrad Kirov Ba-
king Factory 1 1 2 2 
Petersburg Flour Mill 2 2 5 0 
Zavod Volna 4 1 1 1 
Inteltech 4 2 1 2 
Techpribor 6 1 4 1 
Proletarsky zavod 2 2 1 3 
Zvezda 7 2 4 1 
Svetlana 5 1 14 3 
Radiosvyaz 1 1 — — 
Rollman Group 5 - 8 — 
Arsagera 11 1 3 — 
Federal Testing Centre 2 1 — — 
Bank Saint Petersburg 35 1 5 7 
Vitabank … … … … 
 
Source: SPARK system. URL: http://www.spark-interfax.ru/ (accessed Ap-
ril 5, 2017). 
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Key to a better quality of corporate governance in these companies 
are an accurate identification and delineation of responsibilities between 
parent and affiliate management, efficient participation in the work of the 
affiliates and subsidiaries’ boards of directors, a clear procedure for the 
approval of major and interested party transactions. Almost all the com-
panies are characterised by concentrated corporate control, i. e. one of 
their co-owners holds a blocking minority stake (over 25 %). The activi-
ties of the companies surveyed suggest that their managers have key 
competencies in the following fields: 
— the preparation and implementation of a development strategy 
(Rostelecom, Gazprom Neft, Bank Saint Petersburg); 
— the preparation and implementation of long-term development, 
import substitution, innovative development, and energy efficiency pro-
grammes in the affiliates of state corporations (Rostech) and companies 
with more than 50 % of state ownership, in accordance with the Govern-
ment regulations and recommendations from the Ministry of Economic 
Development; 
— the implementation of the ‘Development of the Defence Industry’, 
‘National technology’, ‘Development of Civil Marine Engineering in 
2009—2016’ federal target programmes, and the state armament plan for 
2011—2020; 
— export contracts in the framework of defence cooperation; 
— intellectual right management; 
— introduction of quality management systems; 
— Russian and international product certification; 
— defence procurement; 
— dual-use technology; 
— SPV (special purpose vehicle) projects; 
— engineering collaboration with research and academic institutions, 
including that in the framework of the Union State. 
Most of the companies have announced ambitious plans that require 
investment. Rostelecom intends to break into the market of content and 
digital services (data centres, cloud services, OTT video, Industrial Inter-
net of Things, Geodata). Gazprom Neft plans to continue the modernisa-
tion of refineries and Svetlana to modernise the power supply facilities, 
utility networks, and communications. Power Machines has concluded a 
contract with Gazprom and Linde to produce LNG equipment. The com-
pany is considering the opportunity to enter the renewable energy market. 
Proletarsky Zavod intends to extend production to oil, gas and NPP 
equipment. Gazprom Neft aims to achieve maximum value added on the 
capital invested in Russia’s gas industry. 
Tables 5 and 6 show how Saint Petersburg public companies attract 
investment through issuing shares. 
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Table 5 
 
The issue of shares by the companies surveyed in 2014—2016 
 
Company name Registration date (dd. mm. yyyy)
Stock 
type Offering type Status 
Rollman group 28.01.2016 PBE Public offering Completed 
Techpribor 19.01.2015 CBE Non-public offering Withdrawn 
Lenenergo 03.12.2015 CBE Public offering Competed 
Inteltech 25.12.2014 CBE Non-public offering Withdrawn 
04.05.2016 CBE Non-public offering Continues 
Zavod Volna 17.06.2015 CBE Conversion Withdrawn 
22.10.2015 CBE Public offering Failed 
Federal Testing 
Centre 
27.01.2015 CBE Stock issued to foun-
ders only  
Completed 
Petersburg Flour 
Mill 
28.11.2016 CBE Non-public offering Continues 
 
* PBE stands for preferred book entry stock and CBE for common book-
entry stock. 
Source: SPARK information system. URL: http://www.spark-interfax.ru/ 
(accessed on April 5, 2017). 
 
Table 5 shows that Saint Petersburg public companies do not see issu-
ing stock as a major tool to attract finance. Moreover, in some cases, such 
attempts were not successful, which is indicative of the poor quality of 
preliminary analysis. The issue of stock does not yield the desired result, 
when strategic investors — who are interested in the consolidation of 
control and leadership in a certain market — are more prone to act than 
portfolio investors are [20, p. 11]. 
The dividend policy of the companies surveyed also proved to be in-
efficient. For detail on dividend payments in 2014—2015, see table 6. 
 
Table 6 
 
Accrued dividends, 2014—2016, thousand roubles 
 
Company name Common stock Preferred stock 2014 2015 2014 2015 
Gazprom Neft 30 676 209 30 676 209 — — 
Rostelecom 8 603 004 15 231 824 848 746 1 239 676 
TGK-1 868 780 936 621 0 0 
Lenenergo 0 0 0 0 
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End of table 6 
 
Company name 
Common stock Preferred stock 
2014 2015 2014 2015 
Power Machines 7 879 360 0   
Metrostroy 12 394 13 943 4 943 5 607 
Leningrad Kirov Baking 
Factory 303 188 324 337 0 0 
Petersburg Flour Mill 0 0 23 000 18 600 
Zavod Volna 0 0 0 0 
Inteltech … … … … 
Techpribor 33 035 25 856 22 023 17 238 
Proletarsky zavod 0 0 0 0 
Zvezda 5 620 0 — — 
Svetlana 1 673 1 673 558 558 
Radiosvyaz … … … … 
Rollman group 0 0 7 091 14186 
Arasgera management 
company 0 0 0 0 
Federal testing Centre 0 0 0 0 
Bank Saint Petersburg 887 899 459 313 2 155 2 211 
Vitabank 0 0 30 30 
 
Source: SPARK system. URL: http://www.spark-interfax.ru/ (accessed on 
April 5, 2017). 
 
The classical approach suggests that rational long-term investors pre-
fer shares to bonds and treasury bills, since the former are more lucrative 
[21—23]. 
However, investors are increasingly embracing a risk culture [24, 
p. 29]. According to experts from the Russian Presidential Academy of 
National Economy and Public Administration, an analysis of risks and 
profits associated with different types of assets yields a different result — 
long-term investors prefer corporate bonds [25, p. 64—67]. 
Long-term investors are interested in safeguarding the assets and us-
ing them effectively. Another goal is to reduce risks, which investors 
cannot estimate and do not want to take. The need for investors to man-
age risks in a long-term perspective reduces a company’s investment at-
tractiveness and the cost of its shares [9]. International studies prove this 
finding [26—28]. 
Unfortunately, only three of the surveyed companies have attempted 
to issue bonds (table 7). 
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Table 7 
 
Bonds of the companies surveyed, 2014—2016 
 
Company name Issuance date Announced amount Issue size Status 
Rostelecom September 2016 15 000 000 15 000 000 Issued 
Power Machines Juy 2014 30 000 000 30 000 000 Issued 
Gazprom Neft March 2016 25 000 000 25 000 000 Issued 
June 2016 10 000 000 10 000 000 Issued 
August 2016 15 000 000 15 000 000 Issued 
 
Source: SPARK system. URL: http://www.spark-interfax.ru/ (accessed 
April 5, 2017). 
 
Such passive behaviour of public companies is puzzling, as business 
is keenly interested in investment in performing assets. 
A survey of mangers from 70 Russian non-public companies shows 
that 35.7 % of the respondents do not have experience in investment and 
20 % have a limited experience. The other companies have invested only 
in subsidiaries and affiliates. 
Fifty companies procure funds from other organisations within the 
same holding. Only 21.4 % of the companies surveyed have experience in 
issuing corporate bonds. All the companies use bank loans. 
When answering the question ‘what is your company’s major motiva-
tion to invest?’ the respondents mentioned the following: 
— financing investment projects associated with growth and high 
performance (82.9 %); 
— investing idle funds in liquid vehicles (35.7 %); 
— generating additional income (14.3 %). 
It is easy to predict how potential investors would react to a compa-
ny’s statements not mentioning the rate of return on investment projects, 
holding the results of ROI analysis secret, and offering only general in-
formation on dividends and other financial performance indicators. 
The respondents link their readiness to invest in the equity securities 
of other companies to the opportunity to gain certain rights. Among ma-
jor benefits, the respondents mentioned: 
 participation in the approval of large transactions; 
 opportunity to obtain from the registrar information on share-
holders and the number of shares they hold. 
Other important rights include: 
 to access the list of persons entitled to attend general meetings; 
 to access minutes of board meetings; 
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 to freeze the shares of major shareholders and to call a repeat 
meeting. 
The respondents identified the following rights as the least important: 
 to call an extraordinary shareholder meeting; 
 to influence the procedure of general meetings; 
 to introduce changes into, and approve a revised version of, the 
articles of association. 
In the latter case, the respondents’ opinions seem ungrounded. The 
articles of association often overlook essential aspects of corporate gov-
ernance — board’s powers in regard to the establishment and dissolution 
of executive bodies and the adoption and control over the implementation 
of strategies and business plans. Changes to the articles of association 
will bridge such gaps. 
Anyway, ‘all non-property rights of participants in corporate relations 
should support the property rights of corporate members, since non-
property rights contribute to the achievement of goals, in pursuit of which 
individuals join a corporation’ [29, p. 15]. 
There are bleak chapters in the national history of corporate relations. 
In the 1990s, irregularities in the preparation and conduct of general 
meetings, the erosion of shareholders’ interest through follow-on offer-
ings, and wrongful acts during major and interested party transactions 
were common. I Yu Belyaeva and M A Eskindarov describe such irregu-
larities in the dealings of Gazprom, Lebedinsky GOK, NLMK, Surgut-
neftegaz, Altayenergo, Nosta, and other companies [30, p. 46—48]. It has 
been stressed that: ‘when individuals their different interests act in the 
interests that differ from those of other participants in corporate relations, 
a collision of interests takes place, which can lead to a corporate conflict’ 
[31, p. 7]. The respondents believe that, given the current condition of the 
corporate control market and the level of corporate governance, conflicts 
may result from: 
 reorganisation of a company (77.1 % of the respondents estimated 
the risk as ‘very high’); 
 strategic goals and the ways to attain them (65.7 % named them a 
frequent cause of conflicts); 
 choice of investment instruments, relations with affiliate legal en-
tities (a ‘common cause’ of conflicts according to 66.5 % of the respond-
ents). 
All the respondents stressed the need to improve some corporate gov-
ernance components. When answering the question as to what compo-
nents require improvement, the respondents mentioned the following: 
 risk management, internal control, internal auditing (32 %); 
 organisation of the work of the board (28 %); 
 corporate social responsibility (28 %); 
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 exercise of shareholders’ rights (10 %); 
 executive management (8 %); 
 transparency and information disclosure (6 %). 
Public companies’ apathy and ineffectiveness in governance inevita-
bly reduce the investment attractiveness of the Saint Petersburg corporate 
sector. As a result, the number of private sources of finance and invest-
ment in the projects and initiatives within the city’s strategy for economic 
and social development will dwindle. 
 
 
Prospects 
 
Investors anticipate that better governance will become a common re-
sponse of the corporate sector to the changing conditions of free cross-
industry and cross-territory flow of capital. One of the national priorities 
identified in the ‘Fundamentals of the Activity of the Government of the 
Russian Federation until 2018’ is ‘corporate governance best practices’. 
Industry-specific strategic planning documents, national and regional 
programmes, and the plans and programmes of individual companies 
should embrace this priority. 
Attaining better corporate governance by Saint Petersburg public 
companies is crucial to securing economic growth and socially oriented 
innovative development. 
Saint Petersburg enjoys the status of a federal region. The city’s au-
thorities, acting within their powers, should collaborate with the business 
community: 
 to create a shared knowledge centre so that companies will be 
able outsource the functions of a company secretary, internal auditor, 
non-executive director, and shareholder representatives; 
 to establish ratings as a principal tool for monitoring the quality 
of corporate governance including the cases of public procurement; 
 to create a competitive market in the field of business information 
and due diligence to provide investors with access to reliable and rapid 
data on local investment opportunities, with confidence and national se-
curity requirements taken into account; 
 to collaborate with mass media to ensure the transparency of re-
organisations, mergers and acquisitions, reorganisations followed by the 
creation of non-profits and municipal companies, and bankruptcy, and to 
avoid corporate insolvency; 
 to encourage the Saint Petersburg Union of Industrialists and En-
trepreneurs to develop an institute of corporate governance and relations 
and to create a system of professional communities. 
Having undertaken a mission to create new values and to pursue best 
practices, Saint Petersburg could create a national, or even Eurasian, re-
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search and educational platform for the professional discussion of theo-
retical problems and practical applications in the field of corporate gov-
ernance. This platform could become a talent pool of corporate govern-
ance professionals. 
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